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Calling for a pluralistic and pragmatic approach for causal
inference is of course appealing.1 However, pragmatism can-
not be really considered as a scientific method; it is essentially
a practice. Further, this approach remains relatively vague,
which is problematic as there is no point in estimating a
causal effect that is not well defined, especially for ‘policy
makers who will be unable to translate [this vague causal
effect] into effective interventions’.5 The counterfactual and
interventionist approach is better defined, and fundamentally
pragmatic, by making explicit the link with interventions
rather than statistical association, will help us move from risk
factor toward ‘consequentialist’ epidemiology.13
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We thank Vanderweele and co-authors for their letter.1
We wish to discuss three points in response.
First, Vanderweele et al. contend that we attack a straw
man by lumbering the restricted potential outcomes
approach (RPOA) with a commitment to defining causal
effects in relation to humanly feasible interventions, when in
fact the requirement is only that interventions be well
defined, and not that they be humanly feasible.
We respond:
i. that in our paper we explicitly pointed out that a com-
mitment to humanly feasible interventions is not logi-
cally implied by the RPOA;
ii. that nevertheless, much of the theoretical work and
pedagogy in this field restricts itself in practice to
humanly feasible interventions in its choice of exam-
ples; and
iii. that the root cause of much confusion is that the notion
of an intervention is entirely unclear in the RPOA.
The last point (iii) bears emphasis. What is an interven-
tion? What makes an intervention well defined?
Among epidemiologists it is common to reserve the
term ‘intervention’ for humanly feasible policy or medical
actions. It is clear from their letter that Vanderweele et al.
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do not mean this. But then it is not clear what exactly is
meant by ‘intervention’ or ‘well defined.’
In the RPOA literature, the notion of a well-defined
intervention is central. According to the RPOA, the
causal effect of an exposure is not well defined unless
an intervention on the exposure of interest is well defined.2
In RPOA writings, it is seen as highly problematic to
seek to estimate the effect of an exposure by simply speci-
fying the hypothetical alteration of an exposure, without
specifying an intervention upon that exposure. We are
told that one cannot simply estimate the effect of being
obese (rather than normal weight) on mortality;2; one
must specify the obesity-reducing intervention one has in
mind, since different interventions may differently affect
mortality.
Similarly, we are told that one cannot directly estimate
the effect of being one race rather than another, because
there are ‘no reasonable hypothetical interventions when
race itself is the exposure’.3 (We follow this literature in
using the term ‘race’ and set aside controversies about race
and ethnicity,4 If ‘race’ is contested, ‘ethnicity’ could be
inserted instead.) One can get around this problem either
by substituting something like ‘the race perceived on a job
application, which can be hypothetically manipulated’;3
but for a ‘general interpretation of race’,3 one must esti-
mate it as the residual effect after the effects of various
‘more manipulable factors’ are subtracted.3 The same
strategy is also recommended for ‘other non-manipulable
exposure [sic] such as sex’.3 Thus we conclude from RPOA
writings that for a direct estimate of a causal effect of an
exposure variable on an outcome variable, one must spec-
ify an intervention on the exposure—and define it well.2.
Given this reliance on the notion of a well-defined inter-
vention, the notion of intervention itself has not been
adequately defined. In particular, we have nowhere else
seen such a clear statement as in this letter that human fea-
sibility is not part of what is meant by ‘manipulable’, ‘rea-
sonable hypothetical intervention’ and similar expressions.
We welcome the clarification.
Even with this clarification, the notion of ‘well-defined
intervention’ is still inadequately defined. ‘One hour of
physical exercise a day’ is held up as a well-defined inter-
vention on obesity with respect to mortality.2 But it
appears to us to be no better specified (and perhaps worse)
than the contrast between being obese [e.g. as indicated by
a body mass index (BMI) of 35] or non-obese (e.g. BMI of
25), given the various physiological effects of different
kinds of exercise. Likewise we are not convinced that con-
templated interventions on socioeconomic status3 are
really any more uniform or less varied in the diversity of
their potential outcomes (nor, for that matter, more
humanly feasible) than interventions on race itself.
Unless ‘intervention’ is defined, introducing that notion
does not help solve the problem of guaranteeing uniform
potential outcomes of adjustments to exposure variables.
Unless something more is said about them, interventions
are just surgical adjustments of certain other variables
(exercise habits, socioeconomic status); so why not surgi-
cally adjust the exposure variable (obesity, race) itself? A
uniform potential outcome is guaranteed in neither case.
Moreover, until ‘intervention’ is defined, there is a lack
of clarity in the RPOA itself: in what exactly is being
asserted, and on exactly what basis some effect estimates are
disallowed—while others are permitted—the title ‘causal’.
We worry in particular that the approach will be understood
as limiting epidemiological research to the investigation of
humanly manipulable factors, because of the common use
of ‘intervention’ to mean something one can actually do,
because of the use of language that permits or suggests this
interpretation in various RPOA writings and because of the
lack of worked examples that do not fit this paradigm.
Second, Vanderweele et al. object to our introduction of
a new term (RPOA). To our knowledge, no equivalent
view to theirs is expressed elsewhere in the literature. Their
view differs from well-known interventionist views such as
those of Judea Pearl or James Woodward, since those
views allow any logically possible adjustment of a value of
a variable as an intervention5 or a surgical incision in a
directed acyclic graph (DAG).6 Thus they would see no
intrinsic difficulty in defining and computing effects of
obesity status or race, although they would doubtless insist
that the hypothetical intervention be done to a causal
model that properly represented the various relationships
between the variables. Proponents of the RPOA have, in
contrast, argued that it is difficult or impossible to estimate
causal effects for obesity status or race because of the
absence of well-defined interventions upon them.2,3 Thus
the RPOA introduces a new notion of intervention (one
not yet properly defined, as noted above), and thus a new
term is appropriate.
Third, Vanderweele et al. accuse us of a logical fallacy,
although they do not show that we have committed the fal-
lacy they specify. We do not agree that we have committed
this fallacy. Their substantive point appears to be that
what we call the RPOA is not, in fact, a theory of causation
or causal inference in toto, but is rather the study of a cer-
tain subset of cases of causality: those counterfactuals that
correspond to well-defined interventions. This also
amounts to a ‘straw man’ charge.
In response, we distinguish three possible positions that
might be taken by VanderWeele et al.:
i. variables such as obesity status and race (along with
many other ‘states’) cannot be considered causes in
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their own right, in the absence of well-defined interven-
tions upon them;
ii. such variables may be causes, but at this stage they are
not being incorporated into causal inference theory,
which is focusing on the more tractable problem of esti-
mation of causal effects of variables upon which there
are interventions which are well-specified;
iii. they are causes, but cannot be incorporated into causal
inference theory as it is currently being developed,
although they can be incorporated into broader
approaches (perhaps via a pragmatic pluralism).
Contrary to what they contend in their letter, RPOA
advocates (at least sometimes) appear to take position (i).
For example: ‘Causal effects cannot be defined, much less
computed, in the absence of well-defined interventions’.2
We believe that this is either an expression of (i) or else rea-
sonably interpreted as such. Instead of asking ‘How much
cardiovascular disease is caused by obesity?’ we are told
that we should ask ‘How much cardiovascular disease can
be prevented by a specific intervention which reduces obe-
sity?’ If this is a directive, and not merely a choice, then (i)
appears to be the position. The restriction of (i) may be rea-
sonable enough in devising policy,7 but it would be a
remarkable extension to apply it to assessing causality itself.
In contrast, in their letter VanderWeele et al. seem to
take position (ii) and argue that they are simply focusing
on the estimation of causal effects of well-defined interven-
tions (or their observational equivalents).
Our position is (iii). However, (ii) and (iii) are close. If
Vanderweele et al. are happy to endorse (ii), and concede
that their methods involve just one approach to generating
information relevant to causal inference for a particular type
of cause, then we applaud their efforts, and agree that they
have made major methodological advances in this area.
Nonetheless, our concern remains that in practice the
methods in question are being proposed and understood as a
general theory of causal inference, which we call the RPOA.
We maintain, and in their letter Vanderweele et al. acknowl-
edge, that as a general theory the RPOA leaves out or mishan-
dles many of the key variables that epidemiologists wish to
study. When training epidemiologists to study causes, their
excellent methodological work on estimating the effects of
interventions (real or hypothetical) needs to be studied
together with other approaches to causal inference, as outlined
in our paper. Books bearing titles such as Causal Inference
might more accurately bear titles such as Estimation of Causal
Effects of Variables Under Interventions.
We thank Chiolero for his letter,8 and draw his atten-
tion to each of our independently published works criticiz-
ing aspects of risk factor epidemiology for vagueness.9–13
We share some of the concerns raised in the letter, and we
agree that addressing concerns like these may be part of
the goal of the RPOA; but we do not accept that dissatis-
faction with aspects of risk factor epidemiology warrants
restricting attention to a subset of causal questions.
We thank Schooling et al. for their letter,14 and we
appreciate their remarks and sentiments. We agree that the
methodological revolution in epidemiology in recent years
holds out hope and promise for the discipline. We wish to
reiterate that we are strong supporters of the development
and use of the methods in question; our only concern is
that they are used correctly and, to this end, that they are
correctly understood.
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